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INTRODUCTION 
Shamrock previously cited the case of Volostnykh v. Duncan, Case 
No. 20000288-CA, unpublished (UT App 2001) for the proposition that a litigant has a 
duty to keep himself apprised of ongoing court proceedings. Pursuant to U.R.A.P. 30(f), a 
copy of an unpublished opinion is to be provided when first cited. A copy is attached 
hereto as A-1. Counsel apologizes to the Court and counsel for failing to provide a copy 
with its first Brief. 
ARGUMENT I 
The trial court abused its discretion in setting aside Shamrock's default judgment 
against Owner and Contractor. 
Daedalus and Silver Baron argue that Shamrock failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's decision to set aside default judgment. However, Shamrock 
provided this Court with every bit of evidence of excusable neglect that Daedalus and 
Silver Baron offered to the trial court. The evidence consisted entirely of the Affidavit of 
Alan Wright. The evidence he provided is set forth verbatim on pages 21-23 of 
Shamrock's Brief. The entire Affidavit was attached as A-2. Another copy is attached 
hereto as A-2 for the Court's reference. 
Neither Daedalus nor Silver Baron offered any other evidence to show excusable 
neglect. Despite the fact that both parties requested oral argument, the trial court ruled 
without a hearing; based solely on Wright's Affidavit. (Addendum A-2) 
1 
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The court's decision was clearly against the weight of the evidence in this matter. 
The defendants defaulted early in the case. In their motion to set aside their default, they 
told the court they hadn't read their mail. 
After their initial default was set aside, the defendants prosecuted a counterclaim 
for years. They knew they were in a lawsuit. They knew their law firm was going to 
withdraw. They again chose not to read their mail, which they admit was received. 
Notices and multiple pleadings were ignored. They offered no credible evidence that they 
did anything to keep themselves apprised of the case, or to avoid default judgment being 
entered. 
Daedalus and Silver Baron argue that the case of Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. 
Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) supports the trial court's setting aside 
judgment. It does not. In the Interstate case, the defendants claimed they didn't receive a 
notice of trial setting or their attorney's withdrawal. When they learned judgment had 
been entered, they immediately moved to set it aside. There weren't multiple pleadings as 
in this case. And, the defendants in the Interstate case read their mail. 
In the present case, the defendants admit they received notices and pleadings but 
chose not to read them. Each defendant received a notice of withdrawal, and a notice to 
appoint counsel. In addition, they each received not less than 8 additional pleadings and 
notices. They simply state that it was their decision not to read items received by regular 
mail. That, Shamrock submits, does not constitute excusable neglect. 
2 
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Daedalus and Silver Baron cite the Court's general discussion in the Interstate 
case, concerning the setting aside of default judgments. However, they omitted the 
Court's preface to the quotation relied upon. The Court said: 
It is not to be questioned that in appropriate circumstances 
default judgments are justified; and when they are, they are 
invulnerable to attack. Interstate Excavating, 611 P.2d at 371 
Moreover, the Court did not suggest that lack of diligence can satisfy the excusable 
neglect required by U.R.C.P. 60(b). 
Daedalus and Silver Baron insist that Utah case law provides for the court to 
balance equities when deciding whether or not to set aside a default judgment. They direct 
the Court's attention to the case ofKatz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986) However, the 
Court in the Katz case did not suggest that equitable considerations can displace the 
requirement for excusable neglect required by U.R.C.P. 60(b). It said "the court should be 
generally indulgent toward setting a judgment aside where there is reasonable justification 
or excuse ..." Katz, 732 P.2d 92 
A fairly recent case by the Utah Supreme Court directly considered the 
requirements for setting aside a judgment under U.R.C.P. 60(b). In the case of Jones v. 
Lavton/Okland, et aL 214 P.3d 859 (Utah 2009), the trial court granted summary 
judgment after the plaintiff failed to respond, and its default was entered. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated their analysis began with addressing "the appropriate test for 
determining whether a judgment should be set aside for excusable neglect." Id., 214 P.3d 
at 862 
3 
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With respect to balancing equities, the Court reaffirmed the Rule's requirement, 
and said the parties' equities do not eliminate the need for diligence. The Court said: 
This does not mean, however, that a moving party is entitled 
to relief on the ground of excusable neglect anytime such 
relief might be equitable. We affirm the basic principle upon 
which Airkem and similar decisions rested: that excusable 
neglect requires some evidence of diligence in order to justify 
relief. In other words, while the district court's discretion to 
grant relief under rule 60(b) for excusable neglect is broad, it 
is not unlimited. A district court must exercise its broad 
discretion in furtherance of the ultimate goal of the excusable 
neglect inquiry: determining whether the moving party has 
been sufficiently diligent that the consequences of its neglect 
may be equitably excused. Id., 214 P.3d at 863 
But while a party need not be perfectly diligent in order to 
obtain relief, some diligence is necessary. To grant relief on 
the ground of excusable neglect where a party has exercised 
no diligence at all, but simply because other equitable 
considerations might favor it, subverts the purpose of the 
excusable neglect inquiry. Rule 60(b)'s use of "excusable" as 
a modifier of "neglect" makes clear that mere neglect alone is 
an insufficient justification for relief. The neglect must be 
excusable upon some basis. 
It would be impermissible, for example, to grant relief for 
excusable neglect under rule 60(b) solely because the moving 
party would be severely prejudiced by a refusal to grant relief 
while the nonmoving party would only suffer the 
inconvenience incident to delay of the litigation. Although 
considerations of prejudice and good faith are relevant to the 
excusable neglect inquiry, to grant relief under rule 60(b) 
simply because there might be some equitable basis for doing 
so, absent any diligence by the moving party, would allow 
relief based on mere neglect alone. We decline to read the 
word "excusable" out of the rule in this manner. 
4 
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Therefore, we hold that, in deciding whether a party is entitled 
to relief under rule 60(b) on the ground of excusable neglect, 
a district court must determine whether the moving party has 
exercised sufficient due diligence that it would be equitable to 
grant him relief from the judgment entered as a result of his 
neglect. In making this determination, the district court is free 
to consider all relevant factors and give each factor the weight 
that it determines it deserves. Id., 214 P.3d, at 864 (emphasis 
added) 
In this case, Daedalus and Silver Baron failed to exercise any diligence 
whatsoever. On page 6 of their Response Brief, they state: "As the trial court made a 
finding that there was due diligence and excusable neglect on the part of contractor ..." 
(Appellant's Brief, page 6) Their argument is disingenuous. Indeed, it is false. The trial 
court did not even hint that Daedalus or Silver Baron had exercised due diligence. The 
only attention given by the court was to the contrary, that the evidence showed a lack of 
diligence by Daedalus and Silver Baron. The court said: 
Defendants here seem, at least in this case, to be less than 
concerned at times about this case. It has been lengthy 
litigation and the court is hard-pressed to really understand 
how so many pleadings could be overlooked. However, given 
the situation with counsel and the lack of personal contact and 
a long-term relationship, the court will again excuse 
defendants' failures. (Addendum A-3) (emphasis added) 
There is nothing to even suggest the slightest diligence was exercised by Daedalus 
or Silver Baron. The court was puzzled that they overlooked so many pleadings. And, the 
court recognized that this was the second time the defendants' default was excused. But, 
the court failed to apply the correct standard required by U.R.C.P. 60(b). There was no 
finding of excusable neglect. 
5 
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This is not a case of setting aside a simple default only. Judgment had been duly 
entered. It could only be set aside in accordance with U.R.C.P. 60(b). Daedalus and Silver 
Baron chose not to read any of the pleadings or notices they received. 
Shamrock had the right to rely upon enforcement of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Multiple notices and pleadings were properly sent. Shamrock had the right to 
rely upon the finality of judgments. Utah's rules are designed to protect all parties to 
litigation. •.,,.,„ 
Daedalus received their attorney's notice of withdrawal. They received 
Shamrock's notice to appear or appoint counsel. Shamrock followed the rules by sending 
8 additional pleadings and notices to Daedalus and Silver Baron. However, they chose not 
to read any of them. 
There was no diligence exercised by the defendants. It was clearly error for the 
trial court to set aside Shamrock's default judgment, without finding there was excusable 
neglect. Shamrock asks the Court to reverse the trial court's setting aside the default 
judgment, and to reinstate the corrected default judgment. By doing so, all other issues 
raised in this appeal will be moot. 
6 
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ARGUMENT II 
The trial court erred by arbitrarily reducing Shamrock's damages, without 
considering Shamrock's quantum meruit claim. 
Daedalus and Silver Baron argue that Shamrock did not preserve the issue of 
quantum meruit because the trial court found that an express, integrated contract existed. 
Second, that Shamrock failed to preserve this issue at the trial court. 
A. The trial court erred by reducing Shamrock's judgment by an amount 
estimated to replace a boiler and venting that continue to work and benefit the defendants. 
Shamrock did not design the mechanical, HVAC, or plumbing for the Project. 
(R. 669-670) The mechanical system was entirely designed by the Project's engineer, 
Colvin Engineering. (R. 899, p. 194) Daedalus provided Colvin's design and 
specifications to Shamrock for installation. (Contract, Addendum to Shamrock's First 
Brief, A-1) 
When Shamrock discovered a design defect in the specifications (fluing for the 
boiler and water heaters was incompatible), Shamrock orally advised their Daedalus 
contact, Roy Bartee. Bartee told Shamrock "to work it out" with Colvin. This they did. A 
boiler with compatible fluing was substituted. Daedalus and Silver Baron continue to use 
the boiler to service the subject building, and an adjoining building they constructed after 
the Project. 
Paragraph 10 of the Contract allowed Daedalus "to make changes to drawings and 
in the Subcontract Work." Shamrock was to proceed with the changes. A change only 
7 
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needed to be put in writing if it affected the price of Shamrock's contract. The substituted 
boiler did not change the price of Shamrock's contract. 
The trial court erred by reducing Shamrock's compensation by the cost estimated 
to remove the substituted boiler and associated venting designed by Colvin. Such would 
constitute a redesign of Daedalus' system, something that was never part of Shamrock's 
contract. 
It is the law in Utah that parties to construction contracts frequently make changes 
to the project as originally agreed upon. And, parties waive written provisions orally or by 
conduct and create implied-in-fact contracts. See, Uhrhahn Construction & Design, Inc. v. 
Hopkins, 179 P.3d 808, 814 (Utah App 2008) 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has held that even when contracts require 
changes to be in writing, the parties can waive or modify those provisions. See Richards 
Contracting Company v. Fullmer Brothers, 417 P.2d 755 (UT 1966) ("A contract with 
specific terms cannot remain hypertechnically specific after the parties decide on extras 
... in which event another contract arises based on a so-called quantum meruit theory.") 
B. Shamrock preserved its issue of quantum meruit in the trial court. In order 
to preserve an issue for appeal, an issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way 
that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal 
Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (UT 1998) Specific factors to consider that help determine 
whether the trial court had such an opportunity were specified by the court in Badger: 
8 
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(1) The issue must be raised in a timely fashion; 
(2) The issue must be specifically raised; and 
(3) A party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority. (Id.) 
In this case, the third cause of action pled in Shamrock's cross-claim against 
Daedalus and Silver Baron was for quantum meruit. (R. 46) Prior to trial, Shamrock 
provided the following to the trial court in its trial memorandum: 
Shamrock's Third Cause of Action is for quantum meruit. This 
claim is in the alternative to the Second Cause of Action. 
Quantum meruit is a contract implied in fact and is established by 
the parties' conduct. It requires a request for work, the 
performance of work, that the performing party expected to be 
paid, and that the receiving party knew or should have known 
that the performing party expected compensation. E & M Sales 
West Inc. v. Bechtel v. Diversified, 2009 UT App. 299 (UT App. 
10/22/09) Daedalus requested, and Shamrock performed all work 
as agreed. (R. 604) 
At trial, Shamrock showed how its performance was in accordance with the 
written and oral plans and specifications given it from Daedalus. The only difference 
from the written specifications was Shamrock's substitution of the incompatible boiler. 
Daedalus told Shamrock orally to resolve the boiler design defect with the 
Project's mechanical engineer. This Shamrock did. 
In closing argument, Shamrock's counsel argued: 
The third cause of action is for quantum meruit. If the court were 
to find that some of Shamrock's work was not under contract, an 
implied contract in fact was established by the parties' conduct. 
Daedalus required Shamrock to perform all the work that 
Shamrock performed. Shamrock expected to be paid. Daedalus 
and Silver Baron knew or should have known that Shamrock 
9 
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expected to be paid for the work that Daedalus requested and that 
Shamrock performed. 
They only performed what they were asked to do. They only 
invoiced them for what was done. There was an $ 185000 
overcharge that has been corrected and the numbers given by 
Mr. Barrus are correct. They are asking less than the amount 
Daedalus shows were contained in the six Change Orders, three 
of which they did not provide to Shamrock. (R. 901, pp. 27-28) 
The trial court found that Shamrock did the work and was not paid. (R. 784, f 1) 
The system they installed at Daedalus' instruction worked and continues to work now, 
7 years later. (R. 783, If 1) 
Daedalus and Silver Baron were not damaged by Shamrock's performance. They 
claim the judgment was appropriately reduced because Shamrock failed to give written 
notice of a design defect, and because a mixer valve wasn't installed until Februairy 2005. 
However, it is undisputed that Shamrock gave actual notice of the design defect 
early in the work, in the Spring of 2004, before the contract was signed. The defendants 
had the same protection they would have received from a written notice. 
Shamrock substantially completed its work in December 2004. Thereafter, a 
Temporary Occupancy Certificate was issued, and two months later, in February, the 
mixer valve issue was resolved. Daedalus didn't even have a final walk-through with its 
subcontractors until May 2005. 
At trial, neither Daedalus nor Silver Baron offered any credible evidence of 
damages they suffered as a result of not receiving written notice of the design defect. 
And, except for two months of heat fluctuations, the mixer valve didn't cause any 
10 
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damages. The trial court found Shamrock was not responsible for any delay damages or 
lost rent. (R. 689-690) 
What the court found, was that Daedalus and Silver Baron weren't happy with the 
system they received, and that Shamrock didn't have the right to substitute the boiler even 
though the boiler Daedalus asked for could not be installed, and even though Daedalus' 
Roy Bartee told Shamrock to "work it out" with the Project's mechanical engineer. 
Because Shamrock raised the quantum meruit issue in the trial court, it was 
preserved for appeal. And, it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to arbitrarily reduce 
Shamrock's damages when the defendants weren't damaged. 
ARGUMENT III 
Shamrock's failure to give written notice of the owner's and contractor's defective 
design was not a material breach of a contract when actual notice was given before 
the contract was signed, and lack of written notice didn't damage defendants. 
Daedalus and Silver Baron argue Shamrock failed to marshal evidence relied upon 
by the trial court. The undersigned believed that it did marshal the evidence appropriately. 
Shamrock admitted the parties' contract required written notice of design defects in 
Daedalus' plans and specifications. Shamrock admits it did not give written notice of the 
defect at the time it was discovered. 
The contract was not signed at the time Shamrock gave actual notice of the design 
defect. When notified, Daedalus' Roy Bartee instructed Shamrock to "work it out" with 
the Project's mechanical engineer. Shamrock did just that. 
11 
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A material breach of contract is defined as: 
"A substantial breach of contract, usually excusing the 
aggrieved party from further performance and affording it the 
right to sue for damages." Black's Law Dictionary 7 Edition 
In this case, the parties' contract was not signed at the time Shamrock gave actual 
notice of the design defect. Daedalus received the same level of protection they would 
have received had they been given written notice at that time, or as the trial court 
observed, at the time the contract was later signed. 
Daedalus instructed Shamrock to "work it out" with the Project engineer. They 
could have suspended work until a written notice was presented, or they could have 
suspended work after the issue was put in writing in October 2004. They did nothing. To 
presume they would have done something different if they had received written notice 
would be pure speculation. 
Both parties continued to perform. In fact, Daedalus insisted that Shamrock 
continue to do additional work for more than a year after being notified of the design 
defect. Shamrock substantially completed its work in December 2004. Daedalus orally 
requested additional work into the early months of 2005. 
Shamrock's failure to give written notice in the spring of 2004 did not damage 
Daedalus or Silver Baron. It did not defeat the object of the contract. And, the trial court 
found that it did not damage them or delay the project. 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
As discussed on page 41 of Shamrock's first Brief, the trial court said the failure to 
give written notice was not a dependent or reciprocal obligation tied to payment (R. 785, 
1f2,A-6,p.5,1J2) 
Daedalus had the opportunity under its agreement to notify Shamrock that it had 
breached the contract, and to have terminated further service. However, there were no 
damages upon which they could have sued. A material breach of contract by definition 
includes the right to sue for damages. When there are none, it should not be a material 
breach. 
CONCLUSION 
Shamrock asks the Court to reverse the trial court's setting aside the default 
judgment, and to reinstate the corrected default judgment. (Addendum A-4) By doing so, 
all other issues raised in this appeal will be moot. 
If the Court decides the trial court set aside the default judgment in accordance 
with U.R.C.P. 60(b), then Shamrock asks the Court to reverse the trial court's arbitrary 
reduction of Shamrock's judgment by an amount required to change the system designed 
by Daedalus and Silver Baron. 
The trial court's award of prejudgment interest should be affirmed because 
Daedalus and Silver Baron received the system they designed, and required Shamrock to 
build. They have had the use and benefit of the system since December 2004. 
Shamrock asks the Court to award Shamrock a reasonable attorney fee for this 
appeal. The basis for an award of fees against Daedalus is paragraph 17 of the parties' 
13 
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contract that allows an award of attorney fees to the contractor (Daedalus) to enforce the 
contract. That entitlement is made reciprocal by U.C.A. § 78B-5-826 which provides: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action 
based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after 
April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing allow at least one party to recover attorney fees. 
An award of attorney fees and costs against Silver Baron would be based upon 
U.C.A. § 14-2-2 (3) which provides: 
In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the court shall award 
reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. These 
attorneys' fees shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
In this case, Silver Baron failed to obtain a bond for the Project. (R. 688) They 
didn't even apply for one. (R. 900 p. 249) An award of Shamrock's fees on appeal would 
also be appropriate against Silver Baron because the trial court awarded Shamrock fees as 
the prevailing party. The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
We stated in Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895 
(Utah 1996), "This court has interpreted attorney fee statutes 
broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a statute 
initially authorizes them." In addition, when a party who 
received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, "the party is 
also entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal." Utah 
Dep 't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 
(Utah 1998) 
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i£/ Dated this ^M day of July, 2011. 
t 
~4tJ ^.^=T1Z£<^ 
Mel S. Martin, 
Attorney for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
Shamrock Plumbing, LLC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
/id 
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ # ^^day of July, 2011,1 caused to be mailed, 
first-class postage pre-paid, two (2) copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC, to the 
following: 
Joseph M. Chambers 
Josh Chambers 
Maybell Romero 
Harris, Preston & Chambers, P.C. 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, UT 84321 
Jeremy Sink 
McKay Burton & Thurman 
170 S. Main Street, #800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
)nf)^ki^//< 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
Valery Volostnykh 
and Nellya Volostnykh, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Dorothy Duncan, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000288-CA 
F I L E D 
February 01,2001 
ll 2001 UTApp26 l| 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Sandra Peuler 
Attorneys: 
Shawn D. Turner, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Dorothy Duncan, Salt Lake City, Appellee Pro Se 
Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Orme. 
PER CURIAM: 
Trial courts have considerable discretion under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to grant or deny motions to set 
aside default judgments. See Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986). Consequently, we will not interfere with 
a trial court's decision unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown, jcl 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case. First, plaintiffs did not provide the 
trial court with sufficient support for their request to set aside the judgment. They filed a one page motion with no 
supporting memorandum, no citation to case law, and no analysis of Rule 60(b). 
Second, many of the issues raised by plaintiffs on appeal were not raised below and, thus, are not properly before 
us. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1311 (Utah 1987) (stating "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, appellate 
courts will not consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the 
trial court committed plain error"). For example, plaintiffs did not inform the trial court that the property was held by 
a receiver, nor did they ask that the receiver be made a party to the lawsuit. 
Third, contrary to plaintiffs' argument, the court successfully sent them notice of the October 27, 1999 hearing to 
the 3705 South 3375 West address, though notice had been returned from the 3719 South 3375 West address. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiffs did not notify the court of their changed address until after the default judgment was entered, even 
though they had a duty to inform the court of their location and keep themselves apprized of ongoing court 
proceedings. See, e.g., District Court Rule 83-1.3(b) (requiring "[i]n all cases, counsel and parties appearing pro 
se [to] notify the clerk's office of any change in address or telephone number"). 
Plaintiffs have not shown that the trial court abused its discretion. "That some basis may exist to set aside the 
default does not require the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in refusing to do so when facts and 
circumstances support the refusal." Katz, 732 P.2d at 93. 
Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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Joseph M. Chambers (0612) 
HARRIS, PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendants Silver Baron Partners 
and Daedalus USA, Inc. 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 752-3551 
Facsimile: (435) 752-3556 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
6300 North Silver Creek Rd., Park City, UT 84098 
WHITE CAP CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, 
INC., 
. Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STAR MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., ED ZITE, SILVER BARON 
PARTNERS, L.C., DAEDALUS USA, INC 
FRED W. FAIRCLOUGH, JR., CHRISTINE 
FAIRCLOUGH, THOMAS STREBEL dba 
RESORT CONSTRUCTION DRYWALL, 
IDAHO PACIFIC LUMBER COMPANY, 
INC., BINGGELI ROCK PRODUCTS, INC., 
WESTERN STATES EQUIPMENT CO., 
INC., SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC, AND 
JOHN DOES 1-5, 
* AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN E. WRIGHT 
* 
* 
•Civil No.: 050500453 
* 
Judge Bruee C. Lubeck 
Defendants. 
SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC, 
Cross-Claim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SILVER BARON PARTNERS, L.C., 
DAEDALUS USA, INC., FRED W. 
FAIRCLOUGH, JR., and CHRISTINE 
FAIRCLOUGH, 
* 
x* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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STATEOFUTAH ) 
!SS 
COUNTY of Summit) 
Allen E. Wright being first duly sworn upon oath states and represents as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 21. 
2. The information provided below is based on my personal information. 
3. If called to testify in this matter I would testify as follows: 
4. I am a member of the Defendant Silver Baron Partners, L.C. and also a shareholder 
and officer of Daedalus USA, Inc. In my capacity as an officer of Daedalus USA, Inc., I was 
responsible for oversight of the construction of the Silver Baron Lodge, a large condominium, project. 
The Cross-Claimant Shamrock Plumbing, Inc., acted as a subcontractor'on the project and was 
responsible for the plumbing and HVAC installation. As alleged in the answer to the Cross-Claim 
and the Counterclaim asserted by both the owner of the project (Silver Baron Partners) and the 
general contractor (Daedalus, USA), the contract was breached by Shamrock resulting in significant 
damages to Silver Baron Partners, L.C. And Daedalus USA, Inc., as outlined in the discovery which 
is submitted and attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
5. With respect to Silver Baron's and Daedalus' failure to submit a notice of appearance 
through a licensed member of the Utah State Bar, we would offer the following explanation: 
The attorney at Jones Waldo whom had represented Daedalus and Silver Baron Partners in the 
Shamrock matter was Lewis Francis. Mr. Lewis has represented us on various matters for over 10 
years during which time we1 had been fully satisfied with his representation. When we needed 
t h r o u g h o u t t h i s Af f idav i t "we" r e f e r s t o both S i lve r Baron Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain rrors.
someone to file a lien foreclosure action, Mr. Francis said that this was not his area of expertise, and 
recommended Mr. Mike Kelly from his firm to handle those matters for us. After an initial period 
of representation by Mr. Kelly in which he filed several lawsuits on our behalf, we determined that 
he acted in a grossly unprofessional maimer on numerous occasions and consequently we could not 
allow him to continue to represent Daedalus. We telephoned Mr. Francis and had what we felt was 
a productive discussion with him regarding Mr. Kelly's behavior and our dissatisfaction with Mr. 
Kelly's representation. We indicated that the situation as to Mr. Kelly was not acceptable and we 
requested an audience with the firm's president to resolve the matter. Within a few days of the call, 
we received a very terse email from Mr. Kelly indicating that we didn't know what we were talking 
about, that he was correct in all matters, and we were wrong and that he was firing us, not the other 
way around. He then indicated that he had saved us the time of writing a letter to the firm's president 
by copying him on the email. Importantly we never received any further communication from Mr. 
Lewis regarding his representation in the Shamrock matter. We understood that Mr. Kelly's 
involvement was being terminated but not Mr. Lewis' involvement. To us it appeared that Mr. Lewis 
was deliberately avoiding getting involved in a very explosive situation with another member of his 
firm. While we were waiting to be contacted by Jones Waldo's president in response to Mr. Kelly's 
email, and unbeknownst to us, both Mr. Kelly and Mr. Francis withdrew their representation of 
Daedalus (and Silver Baron Partners) in their respective matters, and informed us via regular mail, 
There was no further communication via email or voice and we never heard from nor were we granted 
a meeting with the president of Jones Waldo. Neither Mr. Kelly nor Mr. Francis contacted us and 
explained what the legal effect of their withdrawal would be or what we needed to do to protect 
ourselves. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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We receive a significant volume of "client copies" from our legal representation in various 
active lawsuits. Normally any legal matter, particularly one that our staff was under the impression 
was being handled by the attorney (Mr. Francis), would not be routed to an officer but would be filed 
as a matter of course. If a matter comes in through personal service or registered mail it goes directly 
to the Office Manager, who then is responsible for reviewing the matter in-house and bringing it to 
the attention of the appropriate officer. Because both of the pleadings, the Notice of Withdrawal and 
Notice to Appoint came in via regular mail the staff member responsible for opening the mail did not 
realize that the practical effect of the pleadings was that we no longer had legal representation on this 
matter. We understood the mail which we received to be the typical client copies normally sent to 
us and that the legal case was still being handled by Mr. Lewis. Mr. Lewis never contacted us to 
orally inform us that he was withdrawing or what effect this would have on us. 
In addition we would ask the Court to take note that as to the underlying dispute Shamrock 
has been paid $ 1,084,3 84.45 on their original subcontract sum of $ 1,119,083.00. The remainder of 
the dispute involves change orders and other matters which are legitimately disputed by Daedalus, 
and are set forth in the Answer to the Cross-claim filed by Shamrock and the Counterclaim we filed 
against Shamrock. 
We would ask the Court to accept this as excusable neglect, inadvertence or other just cause 
on our part. 
Both Daedalus USA, Inc. and Silver Baron Partners, L.C., have a meritorious defenses to the 
action and we would ask to be allowed to proceed to have this heard by the Court on the merits of the 
claims. 
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DATED this 19th day of March, 2009. 
ALAN E.WRIGHT 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on the 19th day of March, 2009. 
Notary Public 
C:Vdocs\jmc\S\Silver Baron Partners\Shamrock Plumbing\affidavit of alan c wrightwpd 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WHITE CAP CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, 
INC, 
Plaintiff, 
' vs. 
STAR MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION, 
et.al., 
Defendants, 
SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC, 
Cross Claim plaintiff, 
. vs. 
SILVER BARON PARTNERS, LC, 
et.al. 
Cross claim defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 050500453 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: April 23, 2009 
The above matter came before the court for decision on 
motion of cross claim defendants Silver Baron and Daedalus 
(defendants) to set aside a default judgment. 
The motion was filed March 23, 2009. Cross claim 
plaintiff Shamrock (Shamrock) filed an opposition response on 
April 6, 2009. Defendants filed a reply April 21, 2009. Each 
party filed a request to submit April 22, 2009, and requested 
oral argument. 
The court has reviewed the pleadings and determined oral is 
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not necessary. The issues are authoritatively resolved by clear 
law. The court has a good deal of discretion in such matters. 
Oral argument would not benefit the court. The court will decide 
the issues based on the pleadings. 
ARGUMENTS 
Defaults wer£ entered March 5, 2009. Counsel for 
defendants, who had represented defendants for over 10 years, 
withdrew but did not personally contact and advise defendants of 
such. A notice to appoint or appear was filed by Shamrock but 
defendants claim they did not receive that or it was 
inadvertently overlooked by staff. The answer and counterclaim 
were stricken and judgment entered because of the failure to 
appoint or appear. The affidavit of Wright, a member of 
defendant. It alleges long-term counsel withdrew by regular mail 
and that correspondence was simply filed and not brought to the 
attention of an officer. 
Shamrock opposes the motion. After service originally in 
2005 a default was entered February 15, 2006. That was set aside 
by the court on April 18, 2006. Discovery then proceeded and 
counsel withdrew on January 9, 2009, three years later. 
Defendants did not respond to the notice of withdrawal. Shamrock 
sent, to the same address, a notice to appear or appoint. It 
-2-
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notified defendants that a default and dismissal of claims may 
occur if counsel were not appointed. After notice of entry of 
judgment in February, defendants did not respond. A proposed 
order was sent to defendants and they did not respond, nor did 
they respond to a request to submit mailed to them. After the 
judgment was signed March 5, Shamrock moved to correct it and 
gave notice to defendants. No response followed. This motion 
followed. 
Shamrock claims that getting notice in the mail, even if 
regular mail, and ignoring it is not due diligence. Defendants 
are familiar with litigation, knew their attorney had withdrawn, 
but did nothing. Defendants got notice to appoint counsel, a 
default certificate, a proposed order and request to submit. All 
were ignored. This lawsuit at that time was over three years 
old. A previous default was set aside based on the claim of 
defendants, through Wright, that it was received by certified 
mail and this claim is that the notices were by regular mail. 
Further, there is no meritorious defense. 
In reply defendants again urge the standard and presumption 
of law in favor of decisions on the merits. Defendants agree 
they will assume the attorney fees.for Shamrock in obtaining the 
default judgment and in this motion. 
-3-
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DISCUSSION 
The court is aware of the strong presumption in favor of 
decisions on the merits rather than by default. The court first 
looks to determine if there has been excusable neglect before it 
turns to an examination of whether there is a meritorious 
defense. 
Defendants here seem, at least in this case, to be less than 
concerned at times about this case. It has been lengthy 
litigation and the court is hard-pressed to really understand how 
so many pleadings could be overlooked. However, given the 
situation with counsel and the lack of personal contact and a 
long-term relationship, the court will again excuse defendants 
failures. 
This motion was filed within weeks of the default judgment. 
There is a cross claim and significant discovery arricl litigation 
which the court believes fills the meritorious defense element. 
While a close call, the court first finds and concludes that 
under all the circumstances, the failure to appoint new counsel 
amounts to excusable neglect. 
Given the short time and given that attorney fees of 
Shamrock will be paid by defendants, there is no prejudice to 
Shamrock in resolving this case on the merits. 
The motion to set aside the March 5 and corrected order of 
-4-
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March 18, 2009, is GRANTED. 
Defendants are to prepare an order in compliance with Rule 7 
which incorporates this ruling and awards attorney fees to 
Shamrock in obtaining the default and in responding to this 
motion. 
DATED this day o 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
-5-
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050500453 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: JOSEPH M CHAMBERS 31 FEDERAL AVE LOGAN, UT 84321 
MAIL: JOSH M CHAMBERS 31 FEDERAL AVE LOGAN UT 84321 
MAIL: MATTHEW G COOPER 5282 S COMMERCE DR # D-292 MURRAY UT 84107 
MAIL: LEWIS M FRANCIS 170 S MAIN ST STE 1500 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84101-1644 
MAIL: MELVIN S MARTIN 5282 S COMMERCE DR STE D-2 92 MUR 
84107 
MAIL: HAROLD C VERHAAREN 5217 S STATE ST 4TH FLR S. 
UT 84107 
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THIRD DISTRICT COl'RT-S!;HH: • 
Z0Q9HAR 19 AH 10= 30 
Matthew G. Cooper, Bar No. 5268 
5282 South 320 West, Suite D-292 
Murray, UT 84107 FILED BY— 
Telephone: 801-284-7242 
Facsimile: 801-284-7313 
MEL S. MARTIN, P.C. 
Mel S. Martin, Bar No. 2102 
5282 S. Commerce Drive, Suite D-292 
Murray, UT 84107 
Telephone: 801-263-1493 
Facsimile: 801-284-7313 
Attorneys for Cross-Claim Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY - STATE OF UTAH - PARK CITY DEPARTMENT 
6300 N. SUver Creek Road, Park City, Utah 84098 
WHITE CAP CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STAR MOUNTAIN CONSTRUCTION, 
INC., ED ZITE, SILVER BARON 
PARTNERS, L.C., DAEDALUS USA, INC. 
FRED W. FAIRCLOUGH, JR., CHRISTINE 
FAIRCLOUGH, THOMAS STREBEL dba 
RESORT CONSTRUCTION DRYWALL, 
IDAHO PACIFIC LUMBER COMPANY, 
INC., BINGGELI ROCK PRODUCTS, 
INC., WESTERN STATES EQUIPMENT ' 
CO., INC., SHAMROCK PLUMBING, 
LLC, AND JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
L 
CORRECTED JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 050500453 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
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SHAMROCK PLUMBING, LLC, 
Cross-Claim Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SILVER BARON PARTNERS, L.C., 
DAEDALUS USA, INC., FRED W. 
FAIRCLOUGH, JR., and CHRISTINE 
FAIRCLOUGH, 
Cross-Claim Defendants 
This Judgment corrects a typographical error in the Judgment entered on March 5, 2009. 
This matter came before the Court, without hearing, the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck 
presiding, upon the Motion of Shamrock Plumbing, LLC for default judgment. The Court, having 
reviewed the pleadings and file in this matter, and good cause appearing therefore, now orders 
and adjudges: 
JUDGMENT 
That Shamrock Plumbing, LLC recover of Cross-Claim defendants Daedalus USA, Inc. and 
Silver Baron Partners, L.C., the sum of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND 
NINETY-FIVE DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-ONE CENTS ($418,095.71), with interest thereonat 
the rate of 2.40% as provided by law. 
Dated this /q day of 
BY THE COURT: 
-H 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ifi 
I hereby certify that on the IL day of March, 2009,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing, CORRECTED JUDGMENT, via first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Silver Baron Partners, L.C. 
2900 Deer Valley Drive 
P.O. Box 1937 
Park City, UT 84060 
Daedalus USA, Inc. 
2900 Deer Valley Drive 
P.O. Box 1937 
Park City, UT 84060 
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